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The proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1–2, 92

I
INTRODUCTION
Among the many contributions made by Marc Galanter to legal scholarship
are a few short works on Jewish identity and on Jews in American legal
professions. More than his limited published work on aspects of law and
Judaism, however, it is Galanter’s regular reference to Jewish law in my
conversations with him that has led me to explore a link between two places key
to his work and his person, namely Israel and India.1 About the latter, of course,
Galanter has written extensively. But to be more precise, the link focused on in
this article is actually that between traditional Jewish and Hindu legal texts,2
neither of which are bound to a particular place, and neither of which form any
significant theme in Galanter’s writing. My argument is thus inspired by
Galanter, and I hope agreeable to him, but not to be blamed on him.
The topic addressed in this short article is what law creates or produces.
Justice is an obvious answer; order is another. Both concepts have long
pedigrees in the realms of legal philosophy and political science, neither of
which will be discussed here. Instead, this article focuses on another thing that
both Jewish and Hindu jurisprudence claim that law can create—a human, not a
biological homo sapiens, but rather the full ideal of what humans were meant to
be. Indeed, it is the essential indistinguishability of law and religion in both
traditional Judaism and Hinduism that permits the ideal human to be created
through religious law.
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1. Galanter himself comments that the connection was made conceptually through his study and
advocacy for legal pluralism in both Israel and India. See MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
MODERN INDIA 300 n.8 (Rajeev Dhavan ed., 1989).
2. Galanter’s footnotes also make occasional reference to the Confucian tradition as well. See
infra notes 5, 9, 18.
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More concretely, in Jewish and Hindu legal texts, the process of becoming
fully human is centered on the study and practice of religious law. For Joseph
Soloveitchik, Halakhah, the principal texts and process of Jewish law, can
create the “Halakhic man,” a tzadik, even a prophet, who is not an obedient
slave of God’s law but a cocreator with God of the Torah.3 For Medhātithi, a
tenth-century commentator on the Laws of Manu, Dharmaśāstra, the texts and
tradition of Hindu jurisprudence, can similarly create the “disciplined man”
(śiṣṭa) who is so imbued with the spirit of the Veda, the perfect revelation, that
he can create dharma (law or merit) through the force of his own personal
substance.4 These are ideal horizons, but their importance is not diminished by
the difficulty of their attainment. In each case, religion consists in great measure
of legal reasoning and processes, the modern circumscription of law to courts,
and contracts being a recognized substrate of religion and law in this larger
sense.
II
LAW AS CREATOR
The ethical import of religious law has been studied many times. Most often
the description of the religious ideal is discussed in terms of the acquisition or
cultivation of a radiant morality—the human ideal being to become a moral
exemplar whose excellence extends outward to the whole community.5 The shift
in language from law to morality is troubling because it tends to privilege a view
of religion as private and internal, a matter of the “spirit.” Thus, the present
comparison centers first on law and what law implies for an understanding of
the human ideal espoused in Halakhah and Dharmaśāstra. A conceptual
emphasis on morality places the internal and the intuitive above the external
and empirical. An emphasis on law, by contrast, suggests that ethical formation
consists of refinements and training that respond to external authorities in a
ceaseless process of self-examination. That examination of the self, however,

3. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983). Soloveitchik’s
views do not, nor were they intended to, represent the variety of Jewish thought on the status and
interpretation of Halakhah. It is unimportant for my argument whether Soloveitchik accurately
represents Jewish tradition, because his vision of what a Halakhic life is—a simultaneously religious
and legal hermeneutic existence—offers a powerful understanding of a potential in the law that has
been subdued.
4. See the discussion in Medhātithi’s commentary on Laws of Manu 2.6, translated in
MANUSMRTI: WITH THE ‘MANUBHASHYA’ OF MEDHĀTITHI 206–08 (Ganganath Jha trans., 1999).
5. For an example, see René Goldman, Moral Leadership in Society: Some Parallels Between the
Confucian “Noble Man” and the Jewish “Zaddik,” 45 PHIL. E. & W. 329 (1995). Goldman’s essay is
quite interesting, but underemphasizes the role of law in both Jewish and Confucian traditions. It seems
shallow, for instance, to characterize the difference between Hillel and Shammai as being between
learning and law, id. at 350, when both men’s views were valued and important to the formation of
Rabbinic law itself. Similarly, to describe the Confucian tradition as possessing an “aversion to law,” id.
at 358, seems unfairly to limit law to fa, in the stereotypical sense of legalism, rather than extending it,
as many have done, also to li, the rituals and rules at the heart of Confucian ethical formation. For a
good discussion of li and law, see R.P. PEERENBOOM, LAW AND MORALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA: THE
SILK MANUSCRIPTS OF HUANG-LAO 124–30 (1993).

Spring 2008]

BEFORE VIRTUE

101

includes developing an awareness of one’s actions by objectifying them and
comparing them to legal norms.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue provocatively criticizes the state of
contemporary moral philosophy and its history.6 For MacIntyre, the
intractability of contemporary moral debates stems from the lack of shared
goods in Aristotle’s sense. People line up on either side of an issue and, because
they lack a common teleological focus, they can never engage in rational
argument, at least as subsumed by the movement toward a shared good.
MacIntyre’s analysis of the problem is persuasive, but his solution—namely,
a kind of return to Aristotelian virtues—is less so. MacIntyre appeals to his
special definitions of “practices” and “internal goods” to define virtues.7 The
missing element is that “practices” are undertaken in the shadow of, and
“internal goods” are defined by, rules or laws that are themselves “socially
established” and “cooperative” (even if they are theologically understood as
eternal, given, and transcendent).8 Moreover, the practice of “practices”
involves a repetitiveness and detailed attention to minor rules that closely
resemble religious life itself.9 Maimonides, for instance, says, “Know that these
moral virtues and vices are acquired and firmly established in the soul by
frequently repeating the actions pertaining to a particular moral habit over a
long period of time and by our becoming accustomed to them.”10 Finally,
“internal goods” are defined as benefiting the “whole community” most often
and most easily through an acceptance of a religious worldview that provides
unassailable assumptions. In this way, law and religion—what MacIntyre calls
“moralities of law”—play a larger role in the acquisition of virtues than he
allows, precisely because that role is played most importantly before virtue
arises.
6. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.,
1984).
7. Id. at 187–91. MacIntyre defines “practice” as “any coherent and complex form of socially
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence,
and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.” Id. at 187. By
“internal good,” MacIntyre intends the contextual and experiential good obtained through practice in
his sense that leads to “a good for the whole community who participate in the practice.” Id. at 190–91.
8. Id. at 190. MacIntyre recognizes the importance and priority of rules but does not give
sufficient weight to the powerful, sometime determinative, effect that rules and the community of
preexisting “practitioners” have on the cultivation of virtue and the pursuit of goods. Id. at 190.
9. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN 38–39 (1982),
speaks of such repetition and “obsessive” concern for details and rules as the heart of religion. Quoting
Freud, then adding his own remark, Smith states, “[L]ittle preoccupations, performances, restrictions
and arrangements in certain activities of everyday life . . . elaborated by petty modifications . . . [and]
little details . . . [the] tendency to displacement . . . [which] turns apparently trivial matters into those of
great and urgent importance remains, for me, the most telling description of a significant (perhaps,
even distinctive) characteristic of religious activity that I know.” Id. However, Smith says nothing of the
transformative power of such repetition—precisely the emphasis found in Jewish, Hindu, and
Confucian traditions.
10. MAIMONIDES, ETHICAL WRITINGS OF MAIMONIDES (Raymond L. Weiss & Charles E.
Butterworth eds., 1975).
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The unexplained element in MacIntyre’s definition of virtue is that it is an
“acquired human quality.”11 How is it acquired? The answer given by Jewish
and Hindu jurisprudence is first through law, that is, through the study and
practice of religious law. MacIntyre emphasizes virtue as something possessed
before practice and the achievement of good. Jewish and Hindu traditions
emphasize the reverse, however. They do so because an initially blind and
repeated self-acceptance of the obligations and prohibitions of law, what
MacIntyre calls “to enter into a practice,”12 produces the experiential and
practical insight into the “internal goods” of ideal Jewish or Hindu life that then
subsequently modulates into virtue or virtues. The radiant morality of the
Jewish tzadik or the Hindu śiṣṭa possesses a beauty that transcends the
limitations of being outside a “practice,” and its charismatic attraction may be
the first impetus for entering into a “practice.” Virtue manifests itself to the
uninformed as beauty and charisma. At the same time, one cannot merely will
or claim for oneself the possession of such virtues. Instead, the value of virtue,
as opposed now to its beauty, can be appreciated only by someone who is
already convinced of the value of the “practices” and the “internal goods” in
each tradition.13 Law is collectively the first instrument, the practical
embodiment, and, in an extended sense, the tangible reward of that conviction.
Rules are prior to repeated activity; repeated activity leads to socially
established “practices”; “practices” achieve goods; and goods instill, and arise
simultaneously with, virtues. Virtues, in this view, validate and naturalize the
spirit of the rules and the value of the prescribed activity. Whereas virtues may
appear to emerge innately in certain persons, the recognition of human qualities
as virtues emerges only after “practice.” The acquisition of the unity of virtues
in Aristotle’s sense14 is coextensive and contemporaneous with the acquisition of
eudaimonia, true human flourishing as an ultimate good. Virtues do not precede
eudaimonia; they constitute it.
For MacIntyre, law and virtue have to be informed by a teleology, a shared
good, in order to have authority.15 The nurturing of virtue for MacIntyre,
however, follows closely on the heels of the identification of that shared good.

11. Emphasis added. MacIntyre’s full definition of virtue, supra note 6, at 191, reads, “A virtue is
an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any
such goods.”
12. Id. at 190.
13. In terms of MacIntyre’s chess metaphor, supra note 6, at 188, one may be initially attracted by
the sheer beauty of watching excellent chess without any knowledge of its rules. However, religious law
of the sort described here would reject that someone could ever really learn to play chess well out of
the desire for a merely “external good,” including in this case its beauty. As MacIntyre himself suggests,
external motivations are premised on the expectation that an appreciation or conviction of the
“internal goods” in chess play will build in the person. “External goods,” including both beauty and
especially the “moralities of law,” therefore, serve as more than enticements; they create the conditions
of possibility or an openness to virtue that may be impossible otherwise.
14. On his view of the inseparability of virtues from one another, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS § 6.13.6 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999).
15. MacIntyre, supra note 6, at 258.
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For Jewish and Hindu texts, by contrast, the shared good of Torah and Veda,
respectively, is mediated in the first place by rules. And it is rules that promote
the virtues that sustain a human life. In other words, laws are the first means of
entry onto the religious path. They are an invitation to the rhetorical
community associated with Torah or Veda.16 To think of laws as constraints on
freedom is to misunderstand what true freedom is in these religio-legal
worldviews.17 Law prescribes certain activities and demands certain restraints
that enable new activities and new knowledge that are otherwise impossible.
The repetition of such activities—whether it be related to ritual, diet, marriage,
contracts, inheritance, or the suppression of crime—constitutes the normative
practice of the community. Virtues come to be appropriated through a
socialization in and self-yoking to that normative practice.18
Consider the structure of the famous Laws of Manu, for instance: the first
half of the work, which gives detailed rules for the daily life of Brahmins of
various kinds and in various stages of life, culminates in an altogether different
listing of the “ten-point law.”19 This list includes what can only be called virtues:
resolve, forbearance, self-control, understanding, learning, truthfulness, et
cetera. Though it is a stretch to read the text as giving myriad rules that result in
a handful of virtues, it is reasonable to view the Laws of Manu as placing first
priority on dharma as a set of enjoined practices and only a distant, secondary
importance to dharma as a collection of virtues.
The movement is really chronological. Virtue, being an acquired quality or
habit, must be forged in the crucible of practices that conform to rules. All
elements—rules, practices, and virtues—are equally important and equally
constitutive of dharma, but one cannot obtain virtue without rules and
practices.20
More interesting, in contrast to a modern legal perspective, is that in this
view practices that conform to rules automatically produce virtues or, better,
material virtue or virtue–substance.21 Think, for example, of a man who
16. Cf. James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal
Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 691 (1985) (“The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its
persuasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it commends.”).
17. Hegel defined freedom in a similar way, though the telos of his Rechtsphilosophie was, of
course, the State. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 149 (H.B. Nisbet
trans., 1991).
18. Cf. PHILIP J. IVANHOE, CONFUCIAN MORAL SELF CULTIVATION 5 (2d ed. 2000) (“The
willingness to submit to mutually agreeable ‘rules’ or forms of play is the beginning of one’s sense of
ritual propriety.”).
19. PATRICK OLIVELLE, MANU’S CODE OF LAW: A CRITICAL EDITION AND TRANSLATION OF
THE MĀNAVA-DHARMAŚĀSTRA § 6.91–93 (2005). Compare this with Laws of Yājñavalkya § 1.122, where a
similar list is given. For a complete English translation of the Laws of Yājñavalkya, see VISHWANATH
NARAYAN MANDLIK, VYAVAHARA MAYUKHA OR HINDU-LAW (1880).
20. Cf. Paul Hacker, Dharma in Hinduism, 34 J. OF INDIAN PHILOS. 479, 490 (2006). One may
compare rules, practices, and virtues of dharma to Hacker’s distinction of dharma before, during, and
after its performance or realization (Vollzug in the original German).
21. Such an assertion also runs counter to MacIntyre’s distinction of external and internal goods,
for one can possess the former outright and yet have no virtue at all, while the latter relies on rules only
as a necessary, but neither efficient nor sufficient cause.
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annually cheats on his taxes by exaggerating his charitable contributions. If he,
short of being audited and prosecuted, stops this practice in order to conform to
the legal rule, then he might be said to have acquired an incremental increase in
his honesty-substance. He may be known publicly as an honest man, but society
does not normally count mere reputation as true virtue. Still, his virtuous act is
itself lawful, good, and incrementally beneficial to his own true virtue. The
point from the Hindu law side, however, is that virtue is not an absolute
possession but is rather directly linked to what one actually does as measured
against the empirical sources of dharma.22 One has the ten-point law in direct
proportion to one’s observance of the great variety of dharmas.23 In this way,
though the law cannot recognize virtue as such, rather only conformable action,
it can produce virtue or virtue–substance. In Hindu jurisprudence, it is not
dharma merely to think “virtuously” about performing rituals, abstaining from
certain foods, charging appropriate interest, et cetera. Once one does act
according to rule, however, a virtue–substance is produced.
Now, this does not sound right today because we all agree that law and
morality can diverge, that a virtuous person can be legally condemned while a
corrupt person is enabled by the law.24 But, from the perspective of these
religious laws, rules must start the process off and are fundamental. The
amassing of virtue–substance through good practice insists that virtue cannot
precede good practice in the first instance. Virtue–substance once obtained may
be “spent” in the further pursuit of goods through practice, but it may equally
be “spent” pursuing practices that do not conform to and are not dharma.25
Here, think of the converse case of a man who has always properly paid his
taxes but this year decides to fudge things a bit for a new car. Supposing these
two hypothetical men sent their taxes in on the same day: which of them at that
moment is virtuous? Would it solve the problem if the second man did it to pay
for his dying wife’s cancer treatments? In this case, virtue as a moral possession
is meaningless because it becomes a game of weighing the relative good
produced by two different actions without a way to evaluate which is better.
Such explorations in obsessive hypothetical problem-solving, what Pincoffs
famously called “Quandary Ethics,” lead one away from the integration of law,

22. Cf. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH (Vol. 1, Book of Knowledge), LAWS OF REPENTANCE §
3.1 (Moses Hyamson trans., 1974): “One whose merit surpasses his iniquity is a tzadik.”
23. The status of the virtues among the famous renouncers of the Hindu tradition is a different
matter, and many different opinions have been given about their legal status and rights and about the
prerequisites necessary to have the virtue-without-dharmic-action existence that they are sometimes
said to have. See generally Patrick Olivelle, Renouncer and Renunciation in the Dharmaśāstras, in
STUDIES IN DHARMAŚĀSTRA (Richard W. Lariviere ed., 1984).
24. Hindu legal texts such as the Laws of Bṛhaspati recognized this, too: “The issue of a lawsuit
may convert a thief into an honest man, and an honourable man into an offender.” See JULIUS JOLLY,
THE MINOR LAW-BOOKS 284–85 (1889).
25. MACINTYRE, supra note 6, at 200–03, recognizes this possibility and responds with an appeal to
shifting contexts and circumstances within a view of the “unity of life,” an oscillation between
potentially tragic conflicts of goods that are each contextually virtuous, but that can only be ordered
relative to each other by an appeal to a transcendent virtue of constancy or integrity.
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religion, and ethical virtues envisioned in Hindu jurisprudence.26 Moreover, this
kind of tragic conflict of virtues would, in Hindu law, be restated in legal terms
as the determination of the proper scope of rules in particular contexts—a
determination that Hindu law insists must occur with marked realism and
situational reasoning.27
Turning to Jewish legal traditions, Deuteronomy 30:16 states: “If you obey
the commandments of the LORD your God . . . then you shall live . . . .” Starting
from this passage, Calum Carmichael builds an interpretation of the unity of
seemingly disparate Deuteronomic laws on the basis of an insistent separation
of life and death.28 The close association of law and life throughout is itself a
theme evident in later Rabbinic works to the modern day, as in Maimonides:
“[L]ife . . . is the reward for performing the commandments”; “the Torah; this is
the tree of life.”29
The strong formulation of this sentiment in the work of Soloveitchik leads to
a further point about the relation of law and the ideal, virtuous human life.
Soloveitchik understands the study and practice of Halakhah as not merely
enabling human life, but as affirming it: “God commanded man, and the very
command itself carries with it the endorsement of man’s existence.”30 This
affirmation also permits and, in his view, demands a human responsibility for
creation, especially, but by no means limited to, self-creation. The links between
command and creation for Soloveitchik are, first, “contraction” (tzimtzum), the
idea that the transcendent and infinite can become concrete and finite, and,
second, the holiness connected to this “descent of divinity.”31 Soloveitchik in
fact makes a direct equation of these elements: “the realization of the
Halakhah=contraction=holiness=creation.”32 In this magisterial vision of the
potential of human life, law’s realization, what throughout this article has been
called its study and practice, is coextensive with a religious view that
understands an individual’s creation of the self as both the highest gift and the
highest burden. It would have tainted the majesty of his vision if Soloveitchik
had considered just how common or practicable his beautiful ideal of law and
human life is for most people. The rarity of achieving the exalted status of
prophet, the end and goal for Soloveitchik,33 forces us to ask again how virtues
manifest in most lives.

26. Edmund Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, 80 MIND N.S. 552 (1971).
27. See Donald R. Davis, Jr., A Realist View of Hindu Law, 19 RATIO JURIS. 287 (2006); Donald R.
Davis, Jr., Maxims and Precedent in Classical Hindu Law, 33 INDOLOGICA TAURINENSIA 33 (2007).
28. CALUM CARMICHAEL, THE SPIRIT OF BIBLICAL LAW 126–41 (1996).
29. MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, at 169.
30. SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 3, at 71.
31. Id. at 108.
32. Id. at 109.
33. See id. at 128.
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My reading of Jewish and Hindu legal texts suggests that with rare (but
crucial) exceptions, people cannot be virtuous, only their actions can be.34 Law
can create prophets, Halakhic men, sages, and divine beings, but it usually does
not. For becoming virtuous as a kind of permanent status is reserved only for a
special few who not only embody the law but also transcend it. And, it is only
by means of the law that one can transcend it. For the rest of us, however, this
kind of transcendence is an aspirational horizon, part of what motivates us to
make our discrete actions lawful and virtuous. The realizations of law do
accumulate virtue–substance in the individual and that accumulation tends to
lead to continued, virtuous action because of the realization of the “internal
goods” achieved at the same time. A definitive, and seemingly irreversible,
change of status to the point of being unable to act against law and virtue is
justly placed in the grasp of only the mythological few.
III
CONCLUSION: CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS
It is unfair and unreasonable to expect this very strong ideal of ethical
cultivation enabled through the study and practice of law to take hold in
contemporary legal settings, especially because of the religious assumptions and
leaps of faith that made such views possible in both traditional Jewish and
Hindu law. Nevertheless, something valuable may still be learned through an
encounter with religious legal texts such as Halakhah and Dharmaśāstra. Even
a limited appropriation of the ideals set forth in Jewish and Hindu legal texts—
not to mention ideals in Islamic, Confucian, and other religious legal
traditions—could create the possibility for law students, lawyers, and other
professionals to move beyond the materialistic and instrumentalist
prepossessions that afflict law today.35 The vocational applications of law and
the intense preparations needed to pursue them must, of course, be preserved,
but the modern habit of leaving the law at the courtroom door should be
broken in favor of seeing what law can create outside as well—not only the
“justice in many rooms” of Galanter’s legal pluralism,36 but also the ethical
liberation of law as duty and ethos.
It is difficult to say how best to incorporate the value of “what law can
create” into contemporary settings without an explicit tie to a particular
religious tradition. One way is exemplified in the work of Harold Berman, who
has carefully examined the role of religion in the formation of Western legal
systems and, on that basis, advocated an “integrative jurisprudence” that moves

34. It is interesting to note in this connection that both mitzvah and dharma have the dual sense of
rule and the result of observing the rule. The good results produced by “doing mitzvahs” and
“performing dharmas” are conceived as substances that an individual possesses.
35. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006),
gives a devastating critique of the instrumentalism of contemporary jurisprudence.
36. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981).
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between legal theories that many consider incommensurable.37 Within legal
studies, a vibrant group of scholars is working on law and religion, and there
Berman’s efforts have borne fruit. Within religious studies, however, law is at
best a marginal topic. Expanded approaches to law from the side of religious
studies, both academic and theological, would reveal the importance of law to
religious ethics in greater detail.38 In both academic and theological arenas,
furthermore, a greater focus on law will affect a larger segment of society in the
form of students and practitioners who would also be able to see the historical
importance of law to religion and the artificiality of their present separation.
Another way of communicating “what law can create” to a larger audience
that would include legal professionals is represented by the law-and-literature
or law-and-humanities fields. The problem in these fields, however, is that they
suffer from precisely the kind of irresolvable moral debate that MacIntyre so
effectively criticizes. The two sides are, allegedly, those who think literature and
other humanistic study make people better or more moral and those who think
this is absurd—as any observation of people’s behavior reveals. On the latter
side, Richard Posner has undoubtedly caught more than a few scholars
overstating the case for what literature can bring to the study and practice of
law, not to mention to their own moral situation.39 No matter how often it may
be heard at humanities pep rallies, it seems impossible to demonstrate that
studying literature by itself makes people better, more moral, and so forth. At
the same time, Posner gives an uncharitable reading of the works of White,
Nussbaum, and others in the law-and-literature field, calling them collectively
the “edifying school of legal scholarship.”40 An engagement with the humanities,
including the kind of ethical study of law outlined here, yields not a greater
personal morality, but rather an expansion of the capacity for criticism
generally. Said’s meditation on humanistic education makes the case without
reference to law:
[H]umanistic study, with all its inner movements, disputed readings, contentious as
well as cerebral ratiocinations . . . can move beyond and inhabit more than just the
original privacy of the writer or the relatively private space of the classroom or inner
sanctum . . . [into] widening circles of awareness . . . . And this is what resistance is: the
ability to differentiate between what is directly given and what may be withheld . . .

37. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003); Harold J. Berman,
Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779 (1988).
38. For what an incorporation of law in Hindu studies might look like, see Donald R. Davis, Jr.,
Hinduism as a Legal Tradition, 75 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 241 (2007) and DONALD R. DAVIS, JR.,
Law, in STUDYING HINDUISM: KEY CONCEPTS AND METHODS (S. Mittal & G. Thursby eds., 2008).
For an interesting comparative perspective on law in Islamic ethics, see A. Kevin Reinhart, Islamic Law
as Islamic Ethics, 11 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 186 (1983).
39. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 305–44 (rev. ed., 1998).
40. Posner, id. at 307–26, reduces the arguments of Nussbaum, White, West, and others to a
common case that literature functions to edify. This not only collapses the differences between the
individual arguments but also oversimplifies their common argument that, in my view, advances
literature as a means of bringing to consciousness fundamental human problems, forms of suffering,
and conflict, not of guaranteeing a moral response to such awareness.
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because one’s own circumstances as a humanistic specialist may confine one to a
limited space . . . or because one is indoctrinated to recognize only what one has been
educated to see or because only policy experts are presumed to be entitled to
speak . . . . Does one accept the prevailing horizons and confinements, or does one try
41
as a humanist to challenge them?

While one may not agree with Said’s default subversiveness or resistance, one
can still appreciate the power of humanistic study to produce expanding
awareness, the possibility of empathy, and the courage to criticize. A
recognition of these capacities as goals of humanities education might erase the
divide over the role of literature in law and of law in the humanities. Greater
integration of the two—pragmatically, more humanities courses in law schools
and more law courses in colleges of arts and sciences—has tremendous
potential to revive the idea and the experience that law can create good, not
primarily as a tool of social engineering, but as a necessary point of entry to the
formation of ethical habits and the possibility of ethical choice for the good.42
In this way, law once again appears before virtue, and although it may not
ensure that people make virtuous choices from then on, the study and practice
of law as ethics and duty does create the very conditions of possibility for
informed, free (and, therefore, ethical) choice.43 Without the humanities, one is
fettered by prejudice. With the humanities, prejudice becomes the
hermeneutical starting point for lifelong acts of self-creation and selfconversation that are otherwise impossible.44 The examples of Jewish and Hindu
views of law, while not directly applicable in most contexts, do nevertheless
provide models of and for the role that legal study and legal observance can
play in the creation of democratic citizens—people who are aware of the
“internal goods” of law and other human institutions, who participate in their
“practice,” and who have, therefore, earned the right to criticize them when
necessary.

41. EDWARD W. SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM 75–76 (2004).
42. It is worth indicating that the kind of integration I intend would not mean simply more courses
on Billy Budd and The Trial, but an incorporation of legal studies into history, religion, art, and any
other humanistic field creative scholars might find productive.
43. The emphasis on law’s capacity to produce virtue–substance as opposed to virtuous persons in
both Jewish and Hindu legal texts has implications for current discussions of “virtue jurisprudence.”
The small group of scholars who try to relate virtue ethics to law tend to take for granted the process by
which virtue is formed in the first place. That assumption needs to be reexamined, perhaps along the
lines suggested here. On “virtue jurisprudence,” see Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A
Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) and ROBERT P. GEORGE,
MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1995). For a critique, see R.A.
Duff, The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 214 (2003).
44. I refer here, of course, to Gadamer’s rehabilitation of prejudice in the context of the “human
sciences.” See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 277–307 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989).

